Paper type: Working Paper
The Skyscraper Revolution:
Tall buildings make up over 20% of real estate by value in the world’s largest cities. Nonetheless, many governments constrain tall building construction, hindering urbanization and growth. Quantification for all cities worldwide using a canonical land use model disciplined with reduced form elasticity estimates indicates that eliminating existing height constraints would generate a welfare gain of 3.7% in developing economies. Aggregate land values would decline by 3.9%, incentivizing landowners to support height restrictions. Estimated elasticities of city population and built area with respect to aggregate city building heights are 0.13 and -0.16, reinforcing the quantitative evidence that tall buildings facilitate urban growth and compactness. Interactions between static demand factors and the geography of bedrock isolate 1975-2015 tall building construction driven by technology-induced reductions in the cost of height. Using indirect inference, we estimate a (congestion) elasticity of consumer welfare to urban density of -0.11.
Take the Q Train
Transit infrastructure is a critical asset for economic activity yet costly to build in dense urban environments. We measure the benefit of the Second Avenue Subway extension in New York City by analyzing local real estate prices which capitalize the benefits of transit spillovers. We find 10% price increases, creating $7 billion in new property value. Using cell phone ping data, we document substantial reductions in commuting time especially among subway users, offering a plausible mechanism for the price gains. The increase in prices reflects both higher rents and lower risk. Infrastructure improvements lower the riskiness of real estate investments. Only 30% of the private value created by the subway is captured through higher property tax revenue, and is insufficient to cover the cost of the subway. Targeted property tax increases may help governments capture more of the value created, and serve as a useful funding tool.
On the Spatial Structure of the Covid-19 Pandemic
The key finding reported here is that when we account for difference in city populations, average population density does not affect the number of Covid-19 cases and deaths in cities. On the contrary, in two cities with the same population, the city with the higher average population density can be expected to have less, not more, confirmed cases and deaths from the Covid-19 pandemic. Data on the total number of confirmed Covid-19 cases and deaths in U.S. metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) on 7 June 2020 shows a superlinear relationship with their populations. Namely, a city with double the population of another one can be expected to have more than double the number of cases and deaths. This relationship is shown to hold in the case of the Covid-19 pandemic. We also know that larger cities have higher population densities, namely that average population density in cities is superlinear as well: A city with double the population of another one can be expected to have a density that is some 15% higher than the smaller one. Multiple regression models that use Covid-19 cases and death as dependent variables and metropolitan population an density as independent ones show a positive and significant effect of population and a negative and significant effect of density. Namely, when we account for the population effect on both cases and deaths and population density, the density effect becomes negative. This is important because there is an unfortunate tendency to ‘blame’ high urban densities on for the spread of the pandemic.
Our Not-So-Urban World
A recent article titled “Everything we’ve heard about global urbanization turns out to be wrong” (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 10 July 2018), citing new figures released by the European Commission, informed readers that 84% of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, not 55% as reported by the United Nations Population Division. In this working paper we present four arguments, backed by ample evidence, contending that the European Commission’s number is implausible if the word ‘urban’ is to retain any familiar meaning at all. First, the share of the global labor force employed in agriculture was 27% in 2015. This share, coupled with an estimated 30% increment to the agricultural labor force in village non-farm employment and an estimated 15% larger household size in rural areas,, suggest that not more than 60% of the world’s population lived in cities in that year. Second, regularities in the distribution of the city population sizes, known as Zipf’s Law, allow us to estimate the population of cities of 5,000 people or more in 2010 as 3.6 billion. 52% of the world’s population lived in such cities and towns that year and not 84% as claimed by the European Commission. Third, the low ‘urban density threshold’ adopted by the European Commission results in the inclusion of entire cropland regions as urban: In Java, Indonesia, for example, 96% of the population living on cropland is classified as urban. And fourth, the low urban density threshold adopted by the European Commission is too low in comparison with observed population densities on the fringe of real-world cities. It implies that a residential plot on the urban edge would have an area equivalent to 1.5 regulation-size soccer fields. The European Commission claims that in 2015 cities occupied 2.27 million km2 and covered 1.5% of the landmass of our planet, more than 2.5 times our own back-of-the envelope estimate. If one intends to believe the European Commission’s estimates, then one can safely conclude that cities should stop expanding right now and that all must be done to contain them. If the world is already 84% urban then one may also conclude that the urbanization project—the relentless migration of people from village to city, from living closer to the land to living closer to each other—is basically over. We, on our part, believe that it is by no means over and that we still have a window of opportunity to prepare our cities for absorbing more than 2 billion people by 2050, many still residing in rural areas. In addition to retrofitting existing cities—which, if we are to believe the European Commission, is all that is left for us to do—we believe that preparing cities for their inevitable and massive expansion and densification in the decades to come is a very real challenge now facing us all.
Top image from Aftab Uzzaman via Flickr.
Invisible Walls
In this paper, we examine the relationship between density and organized violence. Security for most of human history has been one of the determinant factors for city development and growth; this remains true today. What is new, and the focus of this paper, is that the prevalence of organized violence increases the density of adjacent areas. Throughout history, those fleeing organized violence have sought refuge in cities or neighboring towns that provided “pockets of safety” or a measure of “relative security.” We first observed this phenomenon in Colombia when we found that after decades of organized conflict between guerilla groups and the Colombian national government, its cities were denser than neighboring cities. Drawing on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, we found that in a representative sample of 200 global cities, cities with frequent organized violence were significantly denser as well. We conclude that organized violence creates an invisible wall that contains the outward expansion of cities adjacent to organized conflict.
The New Urban Peripheries, 1990-2014
Cities grow in population and wealth and as they grow they both densify and expand. As cities expand, they convert new areas on their rural peripheries to urban use and create new urban peripheries in the process, newly settled areas or newly annexed villages and towns that were formerly on the outskirts of cities and are now contiguous with or engulfed by the city’s expanding urban footprint. These new urban peripheries are the focus of this essay. Previous research, supported by a rigorous theoretical framework, has established an important empirical regularity that characterizes new urban peripheries: They typically have lower average densities. More generally, it has been shown in numerous studies that population densities decline as distance from the city center increases and hence we can expect that as cities expand outwards and away from their older centers, newly built areas will be further away from areas built earlier and will thus have lower average densities as well. Unfortunately, beyond this important finding, very little is known about urban peripheries and particularly about the new urban peripheries, areas built or incorporated into the urban footprint in recent decades. In this essay, which is discursive and non-technical in nature, we report on a number of recent findings than characterize the new urban peripheries—in our case, areas added to cities between 1990 and 2014—the world over, based on our analysis of satellite imagery and census data in a stratified global sample of 200 cities, a 4.7 percent sample of the universe of all 4,231 freestanding cities and metropolitan areas that had 100,000 people or more in 2010. We also report on a few additional findings from a pilot study now underway in ten cities in ten different world sub-regions.
The Quality of Urban Layouts
The research showcased in this paper seeks to explore and quantify the differences in urban layouts in a global sample of 200 cities. This important research allows for the comparison of the quality of urban layouts over time – specifically, between the areas of cities built before 1990 and the areas of cities built more recently. This comparison demonstrates that the quality of urban layouts has gone down significantly in the last 25 years – cities are now reserving less land for streets and roads, average block sizes are increasing, development is occurring further from arterial road networks, and informality is becoming more common. This paper outlines those findings for each of the five UN Regions and also analyzes differences between More Developed and Less Developed countries, as defined by the UN.
Affordability
Governments try to formulate housing policies that will provide socially acceptable housing standards at an affordable price for all. However, governments may exacerbate the high cost of housing in a city by limiting the supply of housing through regulations and underinvesting in urban expansion. In their search for solutions, urban managers often ignore that households’ housing choice is driven by a combination of three attributes: floor area, location, and price of land and construction per square meter. Because floor area and construction quality are the most visible of the three attributes, planners tend to concentrate on improving the design and increasing the area of dwellings when drafting a housing policy. They tend to ignore housing location and its corollary: access to city’s labor markets. When low housing standards are largely due to poverty, ignoring location to provide larger homes might devastate the very population the policy is supposed to help.
SDGs and Urban Sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa
Most urban residents in sub-Saharan Africa lack access to improved sanitation. More importantly, according to the measurement made for the Millennium Development Goals, (MDGs), over the past 25 years average conditions have improved slightly from a very low level. This almost complete lack of improvement occurred during a period when regional real per capita income increased by almost forty percent. As a result, given this apparent absence of response to income growth, it is not surprising that access to urban sanitation in the region has been among the worst performing MDGs. This paper shows that the method of measuring the urban sanitation component of the MDG, and, more importantly, its proposed successor in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), does not accurately reveal whether progress is being made. Even more problematically, the current measure frames the goal in ways that direct resources away from investments with high benefit-cost ratios to approaches which fail cost-benefit tests. The current SDG measure exhorts rather than measures. That is, it is posed in terms of the political motivation for the goal rather than the costs of achieving greater accuracy. Consequently, as Romer says of such approaches: it will continue to “create incentives for participants to exaggerate disagreements…” rather than seek “a broadly shared consensus.”
Key words – Sustainable Development Goals, sanitation, sub-Saharan Africa, data.